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Understanding the neural basis of conscious experience and its regulation are fundamental goals of science. While recent research has
made substantial progress in identifying the neural correlates of conscious experiences, it remains unclear how individuals exert control
over the contents of awareness. In particular, can a memory that has entered the aware state be purged from consciousness if it is not
currently desired? Here we tracked the correlates of consciousness in humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging and dem-
onstrated the involvement of a downregulation mechanism that purges contents from conscious awareness. When individuals tried to
prevent the retrieval of amemory in response to reminders, hippocampal activitywas reduced, as previously established. Crucially, using
trial-by-trial reports of phenomenal awareness, we found that this reduction of hippocampal activation was specifically associated with
moments when a memory involuntarily intruded into conscious awareness and needed to be purged. This downregulation of activity
duringmemory intrusions appears to disruptmomentary awareness of unwanted contents and, importantly, predicts impaired recall of
thememoryon later tests. These results tie the voluntary control of phenomenal awareness toobservable changes inneural activity linked
to awareness, and so provide a neurobiological model for guiding inquiry into the physical foundations of control over consciousness.
Introduction
Neurobiological research on consciousness has revealed neural
activity that tracks the entrance of perceptions andmemories into
awareness (Crick andKoch, 1995; Kreiman et al., 2002; Rees et al.,
2002). For example, both single unit electrophysiology (Kreiman
et al., 2000; Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008) and functional neuroim-
aging (Eldridge et al., 2000; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Montaldi
and Mayes, 2010) have identified neural activity in the human
hippocampus that tracks the presence of memories in conscious
awareness, indicating that activity in this structure contributes to
memories achieving the aware state (Clark and Squire, 1998). It is
less clear, however, how control over the contents of awareness is
achieved. Here we monitored neural markers of awareness to
examine whether people could make contents leave conscious-
ness voluntarily, and, if so, how this purging is accomplished in
the brain. We hypothesized that the controlled suppression of
neural activity supporting awareness may be a key mechanism
supporting the purging of unwanted contents.
To test this hypothesis, we focused on the hippocampus to
determine whether neural activity contributing to mnemonic
awareness can be suppressed when people purge its contents. We
examined how people control mnemonic awareness using the
Think/No-Think (TNT) paradigm developed to study retrieval
stopping (Anderson and Green, 2001). Prior work with this par-
adigm demonstrates that attempting to stop retrieval in response
to a cue makes it harder to recall the associated memory on later
tests (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson and Huddleston,
2012), a finding hypothesized to reflect the weakening of sup-
pressed traces through inhibitory control (Anderson and Green,
2001). We propose that this inhibitory control process, triggered
by the detection of unwanted traces in awareness, suppresses hip-
pocampal activity, providing a physical basis by which people
purge an experience from consciousness.
To examine the purging of content from phenomenal aware-
ness, we isolated moments when a memory entered a person’s
awareness and this awareness needed to be suppressed, and fur-
ther linked these perceptions of memory to functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) measures of hippocampal activation.
For this purpose we used the trial-by-trial introspection method
developed in research on attention (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Sergent et al., 2005; Corallo et al., 2008). Thismethoduses reports
of private, first-person experience collected immediately after a
cognitive operation to analyze behavioral and neuroimaging data
according to phenomenological state. Following this method,
our participants classified their experience after each trial in the
TNT task according to whether the presented cue led its associ-
ated memory to enter consciousness (Fig. 1A). We made four pre-
dictions. First, memories often would intrude into awareness
involuntarily, but attempts to stop retrieval would decrease intru-
sion frequency. Second, howquickly intrusions declinedwould pre-
dict latermemory suppression, reflecting a relationship between the
processes that excludeamemory fromconsciousness and forgetting.
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Third, consciously recollectingassociateson
Think trials would increase hippocampal
activation, confirming its validity as a
marker of mnemonic awareness. Finally,
and importantly, we predicted that during
No-Think trials, because we asked partici-
pants to exclude the associate from aware-
ness, unintended awareness of a memory
would trigger inhibitory control to counter-
act hippocampal signals that contribute to
the recollective state. If so, tracking hip-
pocampal activation during these experi-
ences may allow us to witness the neural
basis of people’s control over awareness in
action.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Eighteen people (10 female, age range: 18–33)
participated. All participants had spoken Eng-
lish as a primary language since early child-
hood and had no history of attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity dis-
order. Two additional participants partici-
pated but were excluded from the study, one
due to scanner error and one for failure to fol-
low the experimental instructions. An addi-
tional 96 participants were enrolled in a
behavioral pilot study.
Materials
Stimuli consisted of 57 word pairs, adapted
from Anderson et al. (2004). Thirty-six exper-
imental words pairs were divided into three
sets, which rotated across participants through
the conditions (Think, No-Think, and Base-
line). The remaining pairs were fillers, which
were used as buffers at the beginning and end
of lists to avoid primacy and recency effects,
and for practice trials.
Procedure
The procedure had three phases: study, TNT,
and test. All phases were performed inside the
scanner, but fMRI data were only acquired
during the TNT phase.
Study phase. Participants studied cue-
associate word pairs for 5 s each and then prac-
ticed retrieving the responses.On each trial, the
cue appeared and participants had 5 s to recall
the associate and say it out loud. After every
trial, the correct associate word appeared as
feedback for 2 s. An experimenter used the key-
board to indicate if each response was correct.
If the correct associate was not provided, that
cue was re-presented after the other pairs had
been tested until each associate was recalled correctly once. Participants
were then tested once more on each pair, without feedback, to confirm
pairs had been learned. Performance on this test was high (96%). To
ensure that unlearned pairs did not contaminate the behavioral or imag-
ing results, all subsequent analyses were conditionalized on correct recall
on this test.
TNT. On each trial, participants received the cue from a pair (e.g.,
Needle) andwere asked either to recall and think about the associate (e.g.,
Doctor; Think condition) or to prevent the associate from entering con-
sciousness (No-Think condition). Each cue word appeared for 3 s. After
every trial, participants received up to 1.5 s to report their experience of
whether the associate entered awareness during that trial by pressing the
appropriate button on an fMRI-compatible box with their right hand.
Participants were urged to make these reports honestly and accurately,
and it was emphasized that inaccurate classificationswould be harmful to
the experiment. Participants were further asked to make their classifica-
tions quickly and intuitively. Participants performed two practice blocks
(25 trials each): first, without making awareness reports, and then with
the reports. Both practice blocks were interrupted midway through by
the experimenter, who administered a structured interview, which in-
cluded corrective feedback, to ensure that participants performed the
task as requested. The actual TNTphase consisted of six blocks of 54 trials
(324 trials total), with each lasting 6 min. Each block included two
repetitions of each experimental word pair (12 Think cues and 12 No-
Figure 1. Behavioral paradigm and results. A, Themodified TNT phase required participants to classify whether and how often
memories entered awareness after each trial. For No-Think trials, we defined any trial when the associate entered consciousness
(either “briefly” or “often”) as an intrusion trial, and any trial when the associate did not enter awareness (i.e., “never”) as a
nonintrusion trial.B, Recall rates for Baseline andNo-Think items for participants in the imaging study and two separate groups of
participantswho took part in a behavioral control study. C, The percentage of Think andNo-Think trials duringwhich the associate
entered awareness. D, The frequency of reported intrusion experiences over the 12 repetitions of each No-Think cue in the TNT
phase. E, The rate at which intrusions declined across the 12 repetitions (i.e., the intrusion slope) predicted howmuchworse later
No-Think item recall was, compared with Baseline recall (i.e., suppression score). Specifically, participants who showed a steeper
decline in intrusion experiences (plotted as a positive value) showedmore below-baseline forgetting on the final test (also plotted
as a positive value). Error bars represent SEM. Suppression and intrusion scores are z-normalized.
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Think cues). The remaining six trials were filler word pairs. The presen-
tationorderwascreatedusingaprogram(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.
edu/optseq) that pseudorandomly mixed the trials and added variable
delays between trials (between 0.5 and 12 s).
Test phase.After completion of the TNT phase, memory for all studied
word pairs was tested to determine how attempts to control awareness
influenced later retention. This phase beganwith a short practice test and
was followed by two types of final test (same probe and independent
probe), with the order of these tests counterbalanced across participants.
The retrieval cue (either the same cue in the same probe test or a category
and letter stem in the independent probe test) was displayed for up to 4 s.
Behavioral measures
The final test data were analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with the
type of final test (same probe or independent probe) and type of item
(Think, Baseline, or No-Think) manipulated within subjects and the
counterbalancing of items through each condition (three levels) and the
order of presentation for the two final tests (two levels) manipulated
between subjects. The behavioral pilot study included an additional
between-subjects manipulation (presence or absence of intrusion rat-
ings). Of critical importance to our hypotheses were planned compari-
sons that contrast recall of No-Think items and Baseline items, which
allow us to assess whether below-baseline forgetting was observed.
The other primary dependent measure was how frequently subjects
reported thinking about No-Think response words either “briefly” or
“often” for each of the 12 repetitions of the cue word. A mixed-design
ANOVA was performed on the intrusion frequency data with repetition
included as a within-subject manipulation (12 levels) and word counter-
balancing (3 levels) included as a between-subject manipulation.
To assess individual differences, we calculated two behavioral mea-
sures for each participant. The suppression score was calculated by sub-
tracting recall of No-Think items fromBaseline items and then averaging
this measure across both of the final tests to provide a measure of how
much worse participants’ memories were for associates they had avoided
thinking about than for similarly old items that had not been avoided.
Note that this subtraction treats forgetting as a positive value, so subjects
who showed more forgetting of the avoided memories had higher sup-
pression scores. The intrusion slope score was calculated by taking the
slope of the intrusion frequencies across the six blocks in the TNT phase.
This measure was proportionalized on initial intrusion frequency to ac-
count for the fact that initial intrusion rates varied and participants with
more initial intrusions had more room to decrease their intrusion fre-
quency. Moreover, we multiplied each slope by 1 to render the (pri-
marily negative) slope scores as positive values, with increasingly positive
slope scores reflecting increasing levels of control at downregulating the
frequency of intrusions. Both measures were z-normalized within that
participant’s counterbalancing group. Z-normalizing within each item
counterbalancing group controls for differences in thememorability and
intrusiveness of items in each counterbalancing set by quantifying how
unusual a participant’s inhibition or intrusion slope score is with respect
to a homogenous group of participants receiving precisely the same items
in the same conditions. Accounting for such item variability is essential
to better isolate individual differences in the processes of interest.
MRI data acquisition
Whole brain imaging was conducted on a 3 T Siemens Allegra scanner at
the Lewis Center for Neuroimaging at the University of Oregon. To
permit localization of functional activations, each scanning session be-
ganwith an anatomical scan using a T1-weighted 3DMPRAGE sequence
(voxel size 1 1 1 mm, TR 2.5 s, TE 4.38 ms, flip angle 8°).
Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) functional images were ac-
quired with a T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar sequence (34
contiguous axial slices of 4 mm thickness, 3.125  3.125 mm in-plane
resolution, 64 64matrix, FOV 200 200 256mm,TR 2 s, TE
25 ms, flip angle 80°).
fMRI data processing and analysis
Raw image data were reconstructed using 2D fast Fourier transformwith
a distortion correction to reduce artifacts due to magnetic field inhomo-
geneities and converted to NIFTI format using MRIconvert (http://lcni.
uoregon.edu/jolinda/MRIConvert/). Preprocessing and statistical
analysis of the data were then conducted using FSL (version 3.3, http://
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). Each fMRI run for a given participant was
modeled separately at the first level. Before statistical estimation, the
following standard preprocessing steps were undertaken:motion correc-
tion using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002), nonbrain removal using
BET (Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of full-
width at half-maximum 4 mm, mean-based intensity normalization of
all volumes by the same factor, and highpass temporal filtering (100 s).
Estimates of the degrees of freedom in the statistical model were cor-
rected for autocorrelation in the data by using the FSL prewhitening
technique (Woolrich et al., 2001). Time-series statistical analysis was
performed using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich
et al., 2001). Each event was modeled as an impulse convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function (a double-gamma basis
function).
Each participant’s six runs were then analyzed using a fixed-effects
model and the group analysis used a random-effects model with FLAME
(Beckmann et al., 2003). Higher level statistical maps were thresholded
by using clusters determined by Z 2.3 and a (corrected) cluster thresh-
old of p 0.05, according to the Gaussian random fields (Worsley et al.,
1992). Registration to high resolution and standard images (MNI152-
template) was implemented using FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001).
Region of interest analyses
Our primary hypotheses concerned activation within the hippocampus,
so this region was manually defined on the anatomical scans based on
established anatomical landmarks (Insausti et al., 1998; Pruessner et al.,
2000, 2002; Zeineh et al., 2000, 2003). In addition, we also manually
defined three other medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions (parahip-
pocampal, entorhinal, and perirhinal cortices). Time-course data were
then extracted from these regions of interest (ROIs) using PEATE (www.
jonaskaplan.com/peate).We calculated ameasure of activity in each ROI
for each trial type by averaging across the time points from 4 to 8 s
poststimulus onset and then subtracting out the onset value to ac-
count for pretrial variability. These values were then entered into a
region by hemisphere by condition ANOVA to test for significance
across participants. Given our a priori interest in hippocampal acti-
vation, however, we begin by reporting planned comparisons within
bilateral hippocampus (we had no a priori theories about hemispheric
asymmetries) and then proceed to discuss the pattern in other MTL
regions. These same values were also used to study the correlation
with behavioral measures of forgetting.
Results
Behavioral results
Memory performance on the final test
Consistent with prior findings (Anderson and Green, 2001;
Anderson and Huddleston, 2012), suppressing retrieval of
No-Think items harmed people’s later memory for those
items on the final test, relative to Baseline pairs that were also
studied but that did not appear during the TNT phase (Fig.
1B). In particular, all three groups showed significantly more
forgetting of No-Think items than Baseline items (fMRI sub-
jects: F(1,12) 16.5, p 0.005; control subjects with intrusion
ratings: F(1,84)  8.6, p  0.005; control subjects without in-
trusion ratings: F(1,84)  9.6, p  0.005) and this did not
interact with test type (fMRI subjects: F(1,12)  2.4, p  0.15;
control subjects with intrusion ratings: F(1,84)  1.4, p  0.24;
control subjects without intrusion ratings: F(1,84)  1.1, p 
0.31). Furthermore, in the control study this forgetting effect did
not interact with whether or not participants had to classify in-
trusion experiences after each trial (F(1,84) 0.1), indicating that
the forgetting effect was unmodified by including trial-by-trial
phenomenal reports. Thus, suppression impaired people’s ability
to recollect memories formed at study, exceeding what would be
expected based on the passage of time, and forgetting did not
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interact with whether participants reported subjective ratings of
their mnemonic experience. These findings confirm that efforts
to control conscious awareness during retrieval suppression im-
pair the later ability to voluntarily recreate consciousness of
memories on a delayed test (Anderson and Green, 2001).
In contrast to the No-Think items, engaging in retrieval did
not, in general, affect retention of Think items (M 86%) com-
pared to performance in the Baseline condition (M  87%),
either in our whole sample of 114 participants (F(1,96) 1.8, p
0.18) or when the analysis was restricted to participants who
performed subjective ratings (F(1,96)  1.5, p  0.22), nor was
there an interaction between subjects who reported ratings and
those who did not (F(1,96) 1). As might be expected, No-Think
items were also impaired relative to Think items, across all 114
participants (F(1,96) 13.4, p 0.001) as well as within the more
restricted sample that reported subjective ratings, (F(1,96)  7.5,
p  0.01), Again, this did not interact with whether or not sub-
jects reported subjective ratings (F(1,96)  1). It is perhaps sur-
prising that retrieval did not facilitate performance, though
facilitation effects are quite small in this paradigm in general,
particularly when performance is near to ceiling, and no feedback
is given during the TNT phase (Levy and Anderson, 2008).
Reports of conscious awareness during retrieval suppression
During the TNT phase, participants reported that associates were
successfully brought into awareness on nearly all of the Think
trials (M  97.1%, Fig. 1C and Table 1). On No-Think trials,
however, participants reported that associates entered awareness
far less frequently (M 37.5%), showing that participants were
largely successful at regulating awareness according to task goals
(t(17)  11.98, p  0.001). Nevertheless, No-Think associates
frequently intruded into conscious awareness. Of the intrusions
that occurred, 93% were classified as “brief” (Table 1), reflecting
either the truncation of mnemonic awareness by control or a
failure to sustain attention toward that memory. Importantly, we
predicted that memories would frequently intrude into aware-
ness involuntarily initially, but that with repeated attempts to
stop retrieval, intrusion frequency would decline. Indeed, intru-
sions declined appreciably from the first suppression attempt to
the twelfth (fMRI subjects: F(1,15)  18.5, p  0.001; control
subjects: F(1,45)  48.6, p  0.001) indicating that participants
gained increasing control over the entrance of memories into
conscious awareness (Fig. 1D). This improved regulation of
awarenessmay reflect amixture of increasing success at preempt-
ing retrieval and accumulating inhibition of suppressed traces
that renders them less intrusive over trials.
Relationship between the control of awareness and later forgetting
If successfully excluding a memory from conscious awareness
and later forgetting represent outcomes of a common inhibi-
tory control process, one should find that variations in regu-
lating awareness predict the amount of forgetting. Specifically,
we predicted that the rate at which intrusions declined over
repetitions would predict later memory suppression, reflect-
ing a relationship between the control mechanisms that ex-
clude a memory from consciousness and later forgetting.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the participants who im-
proved the most at reducing intrusions over repetitions also
experienced themost suppression-induced forgetting on the final
test (r  0.45, p  0.05; Fig. 1E). There was also a correlation
between the overall frequency of intrusions and forgetting (r 
0.62, p 0.01), again suggesting that the subjects who were best
able to overcome intrusions were the ones who were most likely
to forget. This hypothesized control process, triggered to sup-
press momentary conscious awareness of an involuntary recol-
lection, may achieve this regulatory outcome in part by
disrupting the hippocampal representation that contributes to
mnemonic awareness, and that also supports the ability to re-
create awareness voluntarily on later tests. Importantly, these
findings indicate that moments of unwanted awareness indeed
arise in this procedure, that people actively suppress that aware-
ness as we requested, and that we can isolate those moments on a
trial-by-trial basis to track neural activity relating to the purging
of contents from consciousness.
fMRI results
Brain regions engaged by the attempt to regulate consciousness
Attempting to stop retrieval in the No-Think condition has pre-
viously been found to engage a frontoparietal network and to
reduce activation in the hippocampus (Anderson et al., 2004;
Depue et al., 2007). Consistent with these observations, activity
during No-Think trials, relative to Think trials, revealed wide-
spread prefrontal engagement of both lateral prefrontal (includ-
ing dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and lateral
premotor cortex) and medial prefrontal regions (including ante-
rior cingulate cortex, supplementary motor area, and presupple-
mentary motor area), along with bilateral intraparietal sulcus
(Fig. 2A; Tables 2, 3). Importantly, this evidence for the engage-
ment of cognitive control during No-Think trials was accompa-
nied by reduced activation in the bilateral hippocampus and
parahippocampal cortex, relative to Think trials. Thus, the ex-
pected neural systems engaged by retrieval suppression were
found, despite the inclusion of trial-by-trial queries of people’s
conscious experience during Think and No-Think trials.
The modulation of hippocampal activation observed here
tracks the robust differences in phenomenological reports of con-
scious recollection between the Think and No-Think conditions
(Fig. 1C), and it is consistent with our assumption that recollec-
tion is linked to hippocampal activity. To further explore this
modulation, both hippocampi were anatomically defined in each
individual participant based on structural landmarks (Insausti et
al., 1998; Pruessner et al., 2000, 2002; Zeineh et al., 2000, 2003).
Activity within this anatomical ROI was clearlymodulated by the
task, as activity was greater during Think trials than during No-
Think trials (F(1,17) 10.1, p 0.01; Fig. 2B). Importantly, this
modulation reflected both increased activation during Think tri-
als (F(1,17) 6.9, p 0.05) and decreased activation during No-
Think trials (F(1,17) 4.5, p 0.05), relative to pretrial baseline
activity. Thus, hippocampal activation arising in response to a
retrieval cue varied according to participants’ recollection goals.
Increased hippocampal activation during Think trials confirms
the validity as a marker of mnemonic awareness, consistent with
prior electrophysiological and hemodynamic findings (Eldridge
et al., 2000; Kreiman et al., 2000; Eichenbaum et al., 2007;
Table 1. Overall frequencies of phenomenal reports of awareness for Think and
No-Think trials, separated by response typea
Condition Never Briefly Often
fMRI participants (n 18)
Think 2.9% 5.6% 91.5%
No-Think 62.6% 34.9% 2.6%
Control participants with ratings (n 48)
Think 7.6% 9.9% 82.4%
No-Think 64.5% 31.3% 4.2%
aGiven the infrequency of “often” responses in the No-Think condition and of “briefly” responses in the Think
condition, we collapsed across the briefly and often conditions to create a binary measure of awareness.
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Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008; Montaldi and Mayes, 2010). The re-
duction in hippocampal activation during No-Think trials sup-
ports a role of inhibitory control in limiting hippocampal
contributions to conscious awareness. Crucially, however, these
findings leave unanswered whether hippocampal activity was
modulated proactively in response to TNT cues to preempt re-
trieval, or instead was suppressed reactively to purge memories
that momentarily intruded into awareness. Addressing this ques-
tion requires examining hippocampal activation in relation to
reports of mnemonic awareness.
Figure 2. Imaging results and the relationshipbetweenhippocampal activationandbelow-baseline forgetting.A, Comparisonofbrainactivity duringThinkandNo-Think trials.Warmcolors indicatemore
activationwhen participants tried to keep the associate out ofmind thanwhen they tried to bring the associate tomind,whereas cool colors indicate regions thatwere less active during attempts to suppress
conscious awareness (black arrows highlight reduced activity in the hippocampus). B, Activation in a priori structurally defined hippocampal ROIs for Think trials and No-Think trials. C, Activation in a priori
structurally defined hippocampal ROIs for Think trials and both types of No-Think trials: intrusions where the to-be-avoided memory entered awareness and nonintrusions where memory retrieval was
successfully stopped.D, Themagnitudeofsignal reduction inthehippocampusduring intrusions(theaveragepercentagesignal changebetween4and8safter stimulusonset,displayedasapositivevalue)was
correlated, across participants, with below-baseline forgetting of No-Think items on the final test. E, This samemeasure of hippocampal activity during nonintrusions trials was not related to the amount of
forgetting later observed. Error bars for all panels represent SEM.
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Reports of conscious awareness and hippocampal modulation
Because participants’ goal onNo-Think trials is to stop a retrieval
cue from eliciting awareness of an associatedmemory, any intru-
sion of that memory into awareness is counter-intentional, and,
we hypothesize that such a violation of task goals would be more
likely to trigger inhibitory control to terminate awareness. As
such, our most important prediction was that during No-Think
trials, unintended awareness of a memory would trigger inhibi-
tory control to counteract hippocampal signals that contribute to
the recollective state. To observe this proposed purging of mem-
ories from awareness, we isolated trials on which participants
perceived intruding memories in consciousness, contrary to task
goals, and tracked a neural marker of the regulatory impact of
control. Given prior observations of downregulated activity in
the hippocampus during retrieval suppression (Anderson et al.,
2004; Depue et al., 2007) we thought this was a good candidate
mechanism for controlling awareness. This possibility is consis-
tent with analogous downregulations observed in neocortical ar-
eas representing distracting perceptual information during
working memory tasks, which also have been interpreted as
markers for inhibitory control (Gazzaley et al., 2005). If this hy-
pothesis is correct, and if inhibitory control is triggered by neural
signals of awareness, then we should find more downregulation
of hippocampal activation during No-Think trials accompanied
by momentary awareness of an intruding memory than during
No-Think trials not accompanied by awareness.
Hippocampal activation for intrusions and nonintrusions
strongly confirmed this hypothesis. During intrusions, the hip-
pocampus exhibited robust reductions in activation relative to
baseline (F(1,17) 17.3, p 0.001; Fig. 2C). In the absence of an
intrusion experience, however, the reduction in hippocampal ac-
tivation did not reliably differ from either baseline (F  1) or
Think trials (F(1,17)  1.5, p  0.2). Importantly, there was sig-
nificantly less hippocampal activation during intrusions than
during nonintrusions (F(1,17)  9.9, p  0.01; Fig. 2C). These
findings isolate the negative BOLD response observed during re-
trieval suppression to trials that require participants to purge
conscious awareness of intruding memories.
Notably, reduced hippocampal activation during intrusions is
the inverse of what one expects based on the presumed relationship
between hippocampal activation and the degree of recollection.
Given that intentional recollection (Think trials) increased hip-
pocampal activationas expected,we suggest that this inversionarises
from a brief recollective signal that is then countered by a robust
inhibitory control response. This recollective signal during intru-
sions may be difficult to measure given its brevity, variable timing,
and limits on the temporal resolution of fMRI. If hippocampal
downregulation is triggered as a response tomomentary intrusions,
these findings associate people’s goal-directed efforts to purge a
memory from conscious awareness withmeasurable neural impacts
of control on hippocampal activity.
Hippocampal modulation during conscious intrusions predicts
later forgetting
It was necessary to confirm, however, that the reduced activation
evident during intrusions truly reflects the hypothesized control
mechanism thought to underlie the purging of momentary con-
scious awareness. To establish this we needed to show that the
reduced hippocampal response during intrusions was notmerely
the absence of hippocampal activation, but rather a functionally
important downregulation. Toward that end, we examined
whether reductions in hippocampal activation predicted behav-
ioral memory impairment on the final test, which previously had
been established to involve inhibitory control (Anderson and
Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Anderson
and Huddleston, 2012). The hypothesized downregulation of
hippocampal activity may be especially disruptive when it occurs
during an intrusion, in which the neural representation of an
Table 2. Regions more active during No-Think trials than during Think trialsa
Brain region BA Max Z x y z
Cluster extent,
voxels
Right inferior frontal gyrus 44 5.85 52 12 2 32514
Left orbitofrontal cortex 11 5.70 34 20 10
Pre-SMA 8/9 5.54 2 32 46
Pre-SMA 8 5.52 6 16 52
Pre-SMA 6/8 5.48 4 12 66
Pre-SMA/dorsal ACCb 6/32 5.42 6 22 40
Left cerebellum 4.54 34 60 36 4792
Left lateral occipital cortex 18/19 4.38 30 88 14
Left lateral occipital cortex 18/19 4.26 30 84 16
Left occipital fusiform gyrus 37/19 4.07 30 84 10
Left cerebellum 3.91 32 68 36
Left cerebellum 3.79 48 60 42
Left intraparietal sulcus 7 4.85 18 72 54 2382
Left intraparietal sulcus 7 4.32 18 68 42
Left intraparietal sulcus 7 4.19 22 64 60
Left intraparietal sulcus 7 4.09 38 58 50
Left intraparietal sulcus 7 3.90 20 64 48
Left intraparietal sulcusc 7 3.88 16 64 56
Right intraparietal sulcus 7 4.51 26 66 58 2300
Right intraparietal sulcus 7 4.23 14 64 42
Right intraparietal sulcus 7 4.15 24 62 48
Right intraparietal sulcus 7 4.05 18 70 58
Right supramarginal gyrus 40 3.99 54 46 30
Right intraparietal sulcusd 7 3.93 36 64 58
aACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA, Brodmann’s area; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplementary
motor area.
bThis cluster encompassed several other regions including bilateral portions of DLPFC, basal ganglia, insula, and
lateral frontopolar cortex, as well as left inferior frontal gyrus.
cThis cluster also extended down into inferior lateral parietal cortex in the supramarginal gyrus.
dThis cluster also extended down into inferior lateral parietal cortex in the supramarginal gyrus.
Table 3. Regions more active during Think trials than during No-Think trialsa
Brain region BA Max Z x y z
Cluster extent,
voxels
Occipital lobe 17 5.16 20 96 20 11785
Occipital lobe 17 4.76 22 94 16
Dorsal posterior cingulate 31 4.58 6 34 48
Retrosplenial cortex 29 4.49 10 62 8
Retrosplenial cortex 29 4.38 14 62 18
Retrosplenial cortexb 29 4.36 8 54 2
Left insula/Heschl’s gyrus 13/41/42 4.6 38 20 2 2892
Left central operculum 4.38 46 18 18
Left central operculum 4.36 60 8 6
Left Heschl’s gyrus 41/42 4.31 42 22 12
Left insula 13 4.31 36 16 16
Left planum polarec 4.01 50 6 2
Ventral ACC/medial PFC 32/10 4.43 6 48 2 1592
Subcallosal cortex 25 4.27 0 20 10
Subcallosal cortex 25 3.89 4 26 16
Frontopolar cortex 10 3.7 14 62 6
Subcallosal, Medial PFC 25/32 3.65 0 26 16
Frontopolar cortex 10 3.6 6 56 4
aACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA, Brodmann’s area; PFC, prefrontal cortex.
bThis cluster also extended forward into the right hippocampus peak: 32,26, 14 and parahippocampal cortex
peak: 32,34,16.)
cThis cluster extended medially into the left anterior hippocampus peak:4,10,18.)
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episodic trace has been briefly reactivated (Nader et al., 2000;
Dudai, 2004). Inhibitory control may achieve such disruption
(Anderson and Spellman, 1995; Anderson, 2003) and if so, the
amount of signal reduction during conscious intrusions should
predict memory impairment.
Strikingly, the extent to which hippocampal activation was
reduced during intrusions predicted later memory suppression
robustly (r 0.70, p 0.005; Fig. 2D). That is, participants who
showed the greatest reduction in hippocampal activity during
intrusions were the ones who showed the largest below-baseline
memory suppression effects for No-Think items. That hip-
pocampal downregulation predicted memory performance that
was worse than baseline implies the existence of a mechanism
that disrupts retention. In contrast, when intrusions did not oc-
cur, variations in the amount of hippocampal activity bore no
reliable relationship to forgetting (Fig. 2E).
These findings strongly support the hypothesis that intrusions
trigger active downregulation that disrupted later recall of reac-
tivated traces, consistent with reactivation-induced lability (Na-
der et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004). Nonintrusion trials did not reliably
trigger this downregulation response, possibly because items on
those trials did not require control or because awareness was
successfully preempted by other control processes that did not
involve the modulation of hippocampal activity. Collectively,
these findings support the view that reduced hippocampal acti-
vation during intrusions reflects active downregulation that
purges mnemonic contents from awareness. Prior research sug-
gests that a likely candidate for the source of this downregulation
is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), as engagement of
this region during No-Think trials predicts below-baseline for-
getting (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007). Consistent
with those findings, we observed two clusters that predicted in-
dividual differences in below-baseline forgetting (at a relaxed
threshold, p  0.005, 20 voxel minimum), both of which fell
within DLPFC (peak voxels: x18, y 44, z 44; x 30, y
28, z 48). Intriguingly, activity in the left DLPFC cluster during
intrusions negatively correlated with right hippocampal activa-
tion during intrusions (r0.48, p 0.05), but only during a
later time window (6–10 s) than the one used in earlier analyses.
This apparent negative coupling betweenDLPFC and hippocam-
pus suggests that theDLPFCmay provide the source of top-down
control. No reliable correlations with forgetting or hippocampal
activity were observed in this region during nonintrusions. These
speculations fit well with evidence, recently discovered with dy-
namic causal modeling, demonstrating that DLPFC is negatively
coupled with hippocampus during retrieval suppression, partic-
ularly for good inhibitors (Benoit and Anderson, 2012).
Patterns similar to those observed in the hippocampus were also
observed in other MTL regions.
Our primary theoretical hypotheses concerned activitywithin the
hippocampus, but it is possible that other regionswithin theMTL
are similarly modulated by this task. In addition to anatomically
defining the hippocampus, we also created anatomically defined
ROIs for the perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal corti-
ces. We then repeated our analyses for the hippocampus in these
other regions to investigate whether similar patterns are observed
in these otherMTL regions as well. First, we investigated whether
a similar ordering of the Think, nonintrusion, and intrusion was
observed in these regions (Fig. 3). An ANOVA including all four
MTL ROIs revealed a significant main effect of condition
(F(2,34)  5.9, p  0.01) and a marginal interaction with hemi-
sphere (F(6,102)  3.1, p  0.06), but condition did not interact
with region (F  1) and the three-way interaction with region
and hemisphere was also not significant (F(6,102) 1.6, p 0.16).
This suggests that although we have focused on downregulation
of hippocampal activation, the control response appears to ex-
tend beyond the hippocampus. The marginal interaction with
hemisphere reflects the fact that modulation tended to be more
robust in the right hemisphere than the left hemisphere, particu-
larly for the cortical regions (hemisphere did not interact with
any of the effects reported earlier within the hippocampus, Fs
1.5). We also assessed whether the magnitude of downregulation
in these regions during intrusions (but not during nonintru-
sions) predicted participant’s suppression scores. We again ob-
served similar patterns in several of these otherMTL regions (Fig.
3). While these cortical regions were only investigated in a post
hoc fashion, it is interesting to note that the control response
appears to extend beyond the hippocampus proper into sur-
rounding cortical structures.
Discussion
A central feature of consciousness is the ability to voluntarily
direct and control its contents. The present results provide
unique evidence that the capacity to purge the contents of aware-
ness is achieved by suppressing neural activity underpinning the
aware state—in this case, activation in the hippocampus. Criti-
cally, this modulation of hippocampal activation during the
purging of awareness predicted later retention of the purged
trace. These data provide a striking link between the intentional
regulation of phenomenal awareness and the neural events that
implement this control.
The linkage between the intentional regulation of awareness
and the neural manifestations of control observed here is unusu-
ally specific. Simply separating No-Think trials according to par-
ticipants’ first-person experience of whether they briefly
perceived a memory in conscious awareness revealed starkly dif-
ferent levels of activation in the hippocampus, allowing us to
witness the regulatory response on neural processes contributing
to mnemonic awareness. One interpretation of this specificity is
that inhibitory control was triggered by the emergence of un-
wantedmemorial contents in consciousness. Upregulation of in-
hibitory control in reaction to consciously detected conflict is
predicted, for instance, by the global neuronal workspace model
of consciousness (Dehaene et al., 1998; Sergent and Dehaene,
2004), which posits a sharp nonlinear transition between uncon-
scious and conscious processing, and, importantly, a dependence
of executive control on detection of conscious conflict (Dehaene
et al., 2003; Mayr, 2004). A second interpretation is that aware-
ness is sufficient, but not necessary to trigger inhibitory control.
Inhibitory control may be upregulated in response to unwanted
activation regardless of whether a memory is conscious, and re-
activation in the hippocampus may simply correlate highly with
awareness. Indeed, even nonintrusion trials showed a modest,
though not reliable reduction in activity during retrieval suppres-
sion, suggesting that awareness may simply increase the level of
control. Whichever interpretation is correct, these findings sup-
port the view that when unwanted traces are perceived in aware-
ness, inhibitory control can be deployed to suppress activity that
contributes to awareness to end this phenomenological state, es-
tablishing a link between inhibitory control and the purging of
content from consciousness.
Though our data indicate that inhibition is upregulated to
purge memories from awareness, inhibition may not be limited
to this reactive role. Inhibition may be engaged proactively, for
example, to prevent intrusions. Indeed, the sizeable reduction in
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Figure 3. Activation in anatomically defined MTL ROIs and the relationship between this activation and suppression scores. While the primary hypotheses concerned the hippocampus, for
completenesswe report thedata fromall fourMTLROIs in the right (A) and left (B) hemisphere. Eachquadrant represents anROI (illustrated in the coronal slices in the center of the figure) andwithin
those quadrants are four panels: activity during Think and No-Think trials, without distinguishing between intrusions and nonintrusions (upper left); activity during Think, nonintrusion, and
intrusion trials (upper right); the relationship between behavioral suppression scores and downregulation of this region during nonintrusion trials (lower left); and the relationship between
suppression scores and downregulation of this region during intrusion trials (lower right). The value of distinguishing awareness of No-Think items is reflected in the increased control response to
intrusions throughout the panels, and in its robust prediction of forgetting. All error bars reflect SEM.
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awareness of the memory on the very first retrieval suppression
trial (M  60%) compared to the first Think trial (M  97%)
suggests that participants are very good at proactively controlling
awareness. This proactive control may be achieved by downregu-
lating neocortical activity in areas not addressed in the current
study. Intrusions, by this view, may simply trigger one specific
form of inhibitory control that involves modulating activity
within the hippocampus, andmay not represent the only form of
control involved in stopping retrieval. These conjectures fit with
the fact that, while hippocampal reductions during intrusions
predict a sizable portion of the variance (nearly 50%) in below-
baseline forgetting, they do not explain all forgetting, suggesting
the mechanisms involved in preempting intrusions may also im-
pairmemorywithout hippocampalmodulation.Moreover, inhi-
bition is unlikely to be the only means of controlling awareness.
Control over awareness may also be sustained over time, for ex-
ample, by additional mechanisms engaged in parallel with or
after inhibition, that redirect attention to alternative foci, such as
to the reminder or to substitute thoughts (Benoit and Anderson,
2012). At a minimum, however, the present findings show that
hippocampal activation relating to the aware state can be sup-
pressed to disrupt awareness, and that this suppression impairs
retention of the suppressed trace.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the hippocampal re-
sponses observed here is that variations in the degree of down-
regulation during intrusions predicted future forgetting of the
purged trace. The greater the reduction in hippocampal activa-
tion during an intrusion, the worse later memory performance
was for No-Think items, compared with performance on Base-
line items. This variation in hippocampal downregulation under-
scores how reduced hippocampal activation is not an obligatory
sequela of an intrusion; rather, it reflects the outcome of a control
response, varying widely across individuals, which holds the po-
tential tomakememory for suppressed itemsworse than it would
ordinarily be. Critically, this relationship of hippocampal modu-
lation with later retention was absent for nonintrusions, linking
suppression-induced forgetting specifically to the purging of a
reactivated trace from awareness. These observations suggest that
reductions in hippocampal activity duringNo-Think trials reflect
active control and not a mere failure to engage the hippocampus.
If reduced hippocampal activity during intrusions simply re-
flected a failure to engage hippocampally mediated recollection,
there would be no reason to expect a worsening of memory com-
pared with baseline; rather, memories would merely be deprived
of further benefit that would have arisen from their reactivation.
Second, a failure to engage the hippocampus during retrieval
suppression also has difficulty explaining why hippocampal acti-
vation during intrusions was not more similar to that observed
during Think trials, owing to increased engagement of recollec-
tion on those suppression trials. That intrusions were associated
with further reductions in activation compared with nonintru-
sions suggests an active response counteracting recollection.
Thus intrusion-specific reductions in activation are uniquely
predictive of forgetting, consistent with active downregulation in
service of purging the contents of mnemonic awareness.
The strong and specific relationship between our measure of
memory inhibition and hippocampal downregulation during in-
trusions echoes work showing that reactivating a memory makes
it especially vulnerable (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004). In the
present design, awareness of an intruding memory indicates that
the memory has been at least briefly reactivated during the trial.
Such reactivation may render traces vulnerable to disruption,
consistent with research on reconsolidation (Nader et al., 2000;
Dudai, 2004). Disruption might, in the present design, occur via
the suppression of activity supporting awareness, a possibility
consistent with other forms of reactivation-dependent inhibition
(Anderson and Spellman, 1995; Anderson, 2003; Kuhl et al.,
2007). If so, the amount of signal reduction should predict for-
getting, and this relationship should arise only when reactivation
occurs, as we observed. These findings are thus consistent with
reactivation-induced lability (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004).
Although consistent, the exact relationship to reconsolidation is
unclear, as our design does not permit us to address those pro-
cesses, which unfold more slowly over time.
The downregulation of hippocampal activation observed here
may be analogous to downregulations of neocortical areas ob-
served when people ignore distracting input in a visual working
memory task. For instance, activation in the parahippocampal
place area is reduced when places must be ignored during the
encoding of faces into visual working memory (Gazzaley et al.,
2005). This findingmay be an instance of the principle advocated
here, that purging unwanted content is achieved by suppressing
neural activation supporting awareness of the purged content.
What cannot be discerned in that prior work, however, is
whether downregulation reflects preemptive modulation of
areas representing the distracting content to prevent encoding
of that information, or instead the purging of unwanted con-
tents that have already penetrated awareness. No measures
were included to differentiate trials in which distracting infor-
mation entered awareness from those when it did not. Because of
our use of the trial-by-trial method of introspection, the present
findings are unique in tying the voluntary purging of contents
that penetrated phenomenal awareness to the downregulation of
neural activity supporting awareness, and, moreover, in demon-
strating that such downregulation has persisting behavioral con-
sequences consistent with inhibition.
Although the present findings point to neural activation
markers that reflect the purging of mnemonic awareness, BOLD
activation indirectly measures neural activity. If our mechanistic
hypothesis is correct, however, one should observe in the behav-
ior of individual neurons linked to awareness reduced firing that
accompanies the intention to purge unwanted contents. Previous
work has shown that ignoring an object in a visual-selective at-
tention task is linked to downregulated activity in hippocampal
neurons that preferentially respond to that object, providing an
important precedent for the present hypothesis (Cerf et al.,
2010). Unlike the highly targeted control response in that work,
however, the present downregulation appears to be more wide-
spread, and to have persisting consequences. Nevertheless, if
these phenomena are related, purging memories from awareness
may disrupt the stability of themapping of hippocampal neurons
to their preferred objects, reflecting the neural basis of memory
disruption similar to that found here. Thus, observing neural
activity relating to the emergence of episodic awareness and its
termination by inhibitory control should be possible. Because
inhibitory control is engaged in a range of cognitive domains
(Anderson and Spellman, 1995; Anderson andGreen, 2001; Gaz-
zaley et al., 2005), it may also support the intentional purging of
awareness in contexts other thanmemory. If so, the current find-
ings provide a mechanistic hypothesis about how human beings
terminate awareness of unwanted mnemonic content that may
extend to the suppression of conscious content throughout the
brain. The nature of phenomenal awareness itself remains un-
solved (Chalmers, 1995), but the current linkage of first-person
experience to the regulation of neural activity suggests that the
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physical basis by which people voluntarily stop this experience
may ultimately be witnessed and understood.
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